We investigate the effects of bull and bear markets on correlations between developed and emerging country equity returns, and on the benefits of combining international markets in a portfolio. Contrary to most other studies we find that correlations fall in both bull and bear markets, although far more in the former; that emerging markets provide both additional diversification benefits for investors in developed markets and, especially, some protection during bear markets.(JEL: F3, G1, G10, G11, G15)
I. Introduction
Portfolio diversification allows investors to increase returns without increasing risk, and, all else equal, the benefits of diversification are greater the lower the correlation between the portfolio's assets. Cross-country portfolio diversification should therefore be more beneficial the lower the degree of correlation between the markets of different countries. Recently, two strands of the finance literature have suggested that (a) emerging markets have improved the scope for diversification (for example, Goetzmann et al (2002) ); and (b) cross-country returns are more highly correlated -and hence the benefits of diversification are lower -when markets are volatile, particularly in bear markets (see for example, Ang and Bekaert (2002) , Campbell et al (2002) and Erb et al (1994) ).
Using weekly returns data from 44 countries from July 1994 to October 2003 we present in this paper evidence on both these issues. Specifically, we address the following questions:
Are cross-country returns of developed markets more or less correlated with each other in bull and bear markets than they are overall? Is the same true of correlations between the returns of developed and emerging markets?
Are there clear potential benefits to holding diversified portfolios consisting of pairs of developed markets (DEV/DEV pairs) in bull, bear and normal markets? Are any such benefits greater or less for portfolios consisting of pairs of developed and emerging markets (DEV/EM pairs)?
1 Do such benefits in bull and bear markets depend upon investors foreseeing the changes in the means, the standard deviation of returns and the correlation between them in such markets, and adjusting their portfolios accordingly? Or would they largely accrue anyway to an investor holding a portfolio appropriately diversified for a normal market?
Our results suggest the following. First, in contrast to most other studies, we find that international equity correlations tend to fall in both bull and bear markets, though the size of the fall is noticeably greater in bull markets. We also find that DEV/DEV correlations are generally higher than DEV/EM correlations, although the former tend to fall more than the latter in both bull and bear markets.
Secondly, cross-country diversification is worthwhile in normal market conditions, increasing the certainty-equivalent rate of return by an amount roughly equal to the risk-free rate of interest (for a quadratic utility investor with relative risk aversion rate equal to 2). These benefits are higher for DEV/EM pairs than for DEV/DEV pairs. In bull 1 . In what follows we use the term 'diversification' to mean a combination of a risk-free asset and only two risky assets, rather than a multi-asset portfolio. However, we examined these issues both for pairs of markets and for larger groups of markets. While in the case of the larger portfolios there appears to be little to choose between emerging and developed markets during normal market conditions, our central conclusions reported below about emerging markets providing more protection in bear markets remained qualitatively unaltered for the larger portfolios. Because of this we report only the results of testing pairs of markets.
or bear markets that have not been foreseen by the investor, DEV/DEV portfolios lose the benefits of diversification (in fact, the investor may actually lose by diversifying), while DEV/EM portfolios do not. So, emerging markets provide not only additional diversification benefits for investors in developed markets under normal market conditions, but those benefits are maintained during unforeseen bull markets and enhanced during unforeseen bear markets. However, these benefits are small relative to the other effects of truncation on portfolio performance.
Finally, a portfolio that is optimal in normal market conditions will miss out on a large proportion of the gains that might be made from correctly-adjusted portfolios in bull markets, and will lead to heavy losses in bear markets.
It is often the convention in the literature on extreme markets to term a set of especially low (high) returns as a bear (bull) market rather than to adopt the more common definition of a bear (bull) market as a period of time during which returns are particularly low (high) -see, for example, Butler and Joaquin (BJ 2002) and Longin and Solnik (2001) . We shall follow this convention and will therefore refer to bull and bear markets as 'truncated', since they represent tails of the distribution of returns, and use 'normal' to describe markets that are not truncated. We explain below precisely how we define a truncated distribution.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes our general methodology, in particular how we extend the work of BJ (2002) combined with that of Levy and Sarnat (1970) to obtain a measure of portfolio performance; section 3 explains our data and discusses some empirical issues; section 4 presents descriptive statistics and results relating to some broad averages of countries. Section 5 presents the results of formal tests of whether the effects that bull and bear markets have on correlations between DEV/DEV pairs and DEV/EM pairs are different and whether their effects on the benefits of DEV/DEV and DEV/EM diversification are different. It also presents tests of the effects of bull and bear markets on the performance of portfolios involving DEV/DEV pairs and DEV/EM pairs. Section 6 concludes.
II. Methodology
Our framework is a standard model of portfolio selection in which the investor selects among three assets, two of which are risky. This standard analysis usually assumes the risky assets' returns to be bivariate normal, but the analysis is valid for any distribution of returns if the investor has a quadratic utility function. Since we shall be analysing portfolio selection in truncated markets where bivariate normality clearly does not apply, this is the utility function we shall assume.
In the spirit of BJ (2002) 2 combined with Levy and Sarnat (1970) 3 , we can derive an (expected-utility-maximising) optimum portfolio which depends upon the investor's utility function and degree of risk aversion, and on the risk-free rate, the standard deviation of each asset's return, their means, and the correlation between them. We can also derive other portfolios which appear optimal to an investor given the (possibly incorrect) assessment that she makes of those six latter parameters.
Associated with each portfolio and assumed degree of risk aversion is an expected level of utility. From each such expected level of utility it is possible to derive a certainty-equivalent rate of return defined as the riskless rate of return which would deliver to the investor that same level of expected utility. Our measures of both the benefits of diversification and of portfolio performance are in terms of the excess certainty-equivalent rate of return (CERR) over and above the actual risk-free rate of return.
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To assess the benefits of diversification we first calculate the following CERRs for diversified portfolios.
R NN = the CERR that would yield the same expected utility that could optimally be achieved in a normal market.
R TT = the CERR that would yield the same expected utility that could optimally be achieved in a truncated market.
R NT = the CERR that would yield the same expected utility that 2. BJ (2002) investigate the loss of returns from a portfolio invested equally in each of a pair of (developed) markets during a bear market. They quantify the loss as the difference between the return achievable from a bivariate normal distribution with the same parameters as the observed distributions of returns, and the observed portfolio returns.
3. They use standard portfolio theory to determine the optimal mix of assets in the portfolio and measure the performance of portfolios in utility per dollar invested rather than as raw returns.
4. We have not used the Sharpe or Sortino ratios as performance measures since their meaning is not clear in cases of negative returns (see, for example, McLeod and van Vuuren, 2004). would be achieved in a truncated market by an investor who had wrongly assumed that the market characteristics were those of the normal rather than the truncated market.
For each of these we then define a 'plain vanilla' equivalent -i.e. the CERR from a portfolio which consists of the risk-free asset and only one risky asset. We denote these equivalents respectively by VR NN , VR TT and VR NT . The differences between each CERR and its plain vanilla equivalent, denoted DR NN , DR TT and DR NT respectively, provide a measure of the potential benefits of diversification in a normal market, in a truncated market that is foreseen, and in a truncated market that is not foreseen.
To assess the impact of bull and bear markets on the performance of a diversified portfolio, we first calculate ΔM, the difference between R NN and R TT , the maximum gain to be made in a bull market, or the minimum loss in a bear market. We next calculate ΔA, the difference between R TT and R NT . Since any such difference results from the failure of the investor to realise the true nature of market conditions we term this the avoidable effect of operating in a truncated market.
Before presenting results on the interaction of international equity correlations and portfolio performance we analyse certain characteristics of the correlations themselves. We first define the variable COR as the correlation between the returns of two markets under normal conditions, and test whether COR varies systematically according to the nature of the countries that are paired. We then assess the impact of bull and bear markets on these correlations, defining ΔCOR as the change in correlation between two assets when the markets are truncated.
We start by presenting estimates of COR, ΔCOR, VR NN /R NN , VR TT /R TT , VR NT /R NT , ΔM and ΔA, for different broad categories of pairs of markets, for markets truncated at successively higher thresholds in absolute terms. These give an overall view of the behaviour of correlations, of the benefits of diversification, and of how such benefits change in increasingly extreme markets.
We then present a set of regressions from the coefficients of which we assess whether the differences between correlations or CERRs vary according to the investor's home country, or differ for emerging and developed country pairs, and whether they are significantly affected by the value of the threshold itself. Formally we estimate the following sets of regressions:
Model 1:
Model 2:
Model 3:
Model 4: 
LD i are dummies for three selected 'lead' or 'home' countries which are more fully explained below; i = 1,…,3. LD i takes the value 1 if the lead country is the US and is omitted from the regression in models 2 and 4 since the US is the 'baseline' country; i = 2 denotes the UK and i = 3 Australia; THR k is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the threshold at which the tail is truncated equals k, where k = -1, -0.5, -0, +0, +0.5, +1, +1.5 standard deviations from the mean (with the -1.5 threshold forming the 'baseline'); DEV j is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the second country in the pair is a developed market; , equals ; and
When ΔM ij is the dependent variable the models are estimated for positive thresholds only. In almost all cases the optimum decision in a bear market, at any level of truncation, is to invest in the risk-free asset. This means that the reduction in the maximum CERR achievable equals the maximum itself, regardless of the values of the independent variables. International Portfolio Diversification , equals .
We also estimate the following models for the two variables that are unaffected by truncation:
Model 2a:
Model 3a:
Model 4a:
All these tests require a precise empirical definition of a truncated market. We discuss this issue and our data in the next section.
III. Data Availability And Empirical Issues
Because of timing issues there are problems when using daily returns data on international markets. However, the use of monthly data would severely limit the number of observations. We therefore base all our results on weekly returns. We select four 'lead' countries, US, UK, Japan and Australia, one from each of the main trading areas, and pair these with each other and with the non-lead ('subsidiary') countries for which we have data. The 44 countries available are shown in table 1.
For each country we obtain weekly US$-denominated log returns from Datastream, using Datastream code 'TOTMKT'. The returns are adjusted for re-invested dividends (Datastream item 'RI'). In our tests we classified non-lead countries into three main regions: Latin America, Asia (which consists of S.E. Asia, the Far East and India), and Europe (S. and N. Europe, Scandinavia, Russia and Turkey).
Our proxy for the risk-free rate of interest is the three-month US Treasury bill weekly yield. Since we are using dollar-denominated returns we need a dollar interest rate, and under interest parity we should get the same result whether we use US interest rates, or domestic interest rates adjusted for exchange rate movements. The 'youngest' market in our sample is Brazil, which came into existence in July 1994, so we restrict our samples to the period from July 1994 to October 2003, a total of 484 observations. Subject to a qualification concerning Japan discussed below, we assume that this sample provides an accurate representation of the complete distribution of returns. It therefore allows us to calculate conventionally the means and standard deviations of any pair of asset returns and the correlations between them in normal market conditions. And from these, again conventionally, we can calculate for any pair the portfolio that would maximise expected utility.
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To measure the equivalent parameters of pairs of markets in extreme conditions we need to decide (a) whether to condition on one or both of the asset returns when truncating the distributions; and (b) how the thresholds should be expressed (in absolute terms or in terms of standard deviations) and how high they should go.
A. Conditioning
Some researchers condition on both returns -double truncation -but an investor is likely to be interested in the behaviour of a foreign market when the behaviour of the domestic market is extreme, rather than in the behaviour of the two markets when they are both extreme. Consequently we set our thresholds in terms of only one return (single truncation), using the lead market as the conditioning variable. So, for example, for the US/Argentina pair, observations used to estimate the portfolio parameters are all those US observations that lie in the appropriate tail and the associated Argentinean observations.
B. Thresholds
We set our thresholds at 1.5, 1, 0.5 and 0 standard deviations around the mean (in terms of weekly returns of the lead market). We do not go to higher extremes because the number of observations would then be so small that any estimates derived for them would, as noted by other authors such as Bae et al (2003) , be unreliable, and also of rather limited practical importance. Table 2 shows the numbers of observations used for estimation at different degrees of truncation. This table shows that there is some skewness in the distributions, with more observations above the mean (threshold +0), than below it (threshold -0), except for Japan, which, we will see below, has many other unusual characteristics.
7. In doing so we are, of course, abstracting from the practical problems of implementing any particular investment strategy, such as cost or the absence of suitable investment vehicles, both of which might be especially acute in emerging markets.
IV. Descriptive Statistics; Correlations and Portfolio
Performance in Normal and Truncated Markets Table 3 shows dollar-denominated means, medians and standard deviations for weekly returns of the whole sample of country markets and for the upper and lower halves of the distributions. The data for the four lead countries are shown separately, while, to save space, data for the remaining countries are grouped into regions and a simple average calculated.
Of the lead countries, Japan was in a recession throughout the sample period. Furthermore, its median return is considerably lower than its mean, while all developed regions and most emerging ones have the opposite relationship. Whilst this is useful in that it presents us with data on unusual markets, it does question our assumption that the sample period represents the complete distribution of returns. We therefore deal with Japan separately in all the statistics presented below and exclude it from our regressions.
For all the countries, standard deviations in the tails are lower than overall standard deviations. For all but Japan and Asian emerging markets the standard deviation of the top half of the distribution is lower than that in the lower half. Table 4 shows the correlations between the weekly returns of each lead country and each of the other three, and the average of correlations between each of the four lead countries and selected other groups of countries. Correlations are shown for the whole sample and for the upper and lower tails of the distribution. They suggest, very broadly, that correlations between emerging markets and the developed ones are lower than correlations between developed markets (although again Japan is something of an exception); and that correlations in both tails are lower than the overall correlation, a phenomenon that we explore more fully below. Table 5 presents estimates of average weekly CERRs generated by plain vanilla and diversified portfolios in normal markets, unexpectedly truncated markets and correctly predicted bull markets:
8 R NN and VR NN ; R NT and VR NT ; and R TT and VR TT . In the table Japan is treated separately but other lead countries are grouped together, so the results presented there give only a very broad picture of the benefits of diversification. They are also calculated for a particular degree of risk aversion parameter, viz. 2, though we have repeated all the tests and summaries for parameter values 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2.5 and 3 and there were no qualitative differences.
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The first column of table 5 suggests that combining two international markets in a diversified portfolio under normal market conditions yields significant but modest benefits. The average weekly risk-free rate over the sample period was in the region of 0.075%. So, for lead countries other than Japan, domestic diversification (investing in a single market) yielded approximately double this in CERR terms for an investor with relative risk aversion of 2, while combining two markets added an extra 0.05% -0.07% on average. Note that a positive CERR is achievable when holding Japan as the only risky asset, even though Japan was in recession over the sample period, because the optimum mix involves shorting the market to invest in the risk-free asset. Combining Japan with other countries generates the highest CERR in a normal market because of the low correlation between Japan and the other lead markets, combined with the ability to short Japan.
The CERR figures in the last four columns suggest that in correctly anticipated bull markets there are still rewards to diversification, but that they are very small in relation to the overall returns. It is worth pointing out that the very high figures that appear here are caused by short-selling. Clearly, an investor who knows that the market is about to enter a bull period will borrow heavily (short the risk-free asset) and invest in the market; if the investor is correct, as assumed in these columns, high rewards will ensue. An interesting extension of this paper would be to investigate how a restriction on short-selling would affect the results.
8. For our data and sample period, correctly predicted bear markets always generate zero CERRs, since, as mentioned above, the optimal decision is to invest only in the risk-free asset for all pairs and at all levels of truncation. 9. The CERRs at different levels of risk aversion are inversely proportionate to δ/λ/2(1+λ), where λ is the rate of relative risk aversion (RRA). So, for example, the CERRs with RRA 0.5 are twice those with RRA of 2. Therefore regression results at all levels of risk aversion have the same standard errors, although the coefficient values vary proportionately. (Table 5 col Finally, when the lead market is unexpectedly truncated so that the investor is holding the portfolio which is appropriate for a normal market, table 5 suggests that the benefits of diversification are less clear-cut for both bear and bull markets: the CERR on a diversified portfolio is generally higher on average than the CERR on a 'plain vanilla' portfolio but this is by no means always the case. 10 However, in all cases the benefits of diversification per se are very small relative to the overall returns.
These results suggest that, in general, cross-country diversification is worthwhile in normal markets, but that it may not provide much extra protection nor offer greater opportunities in periods of market turbulence. On the other hand, it is not clear from these very general results whether benefits of diversification are actually lost during bull or bear markets. The tests below address this issue formally.
Panels A and B of table 6 focus on the effect of truncation on diversified portfolios, elaborating on some of the figures in table 5. For the sake of space we show only figures for one standard deviation above and below the mean. The figures for other tails had similar patterns. Panel A refers to a bull market, panel B to a bear market. The top left-hand figure in panel A (0.46%) is the CERR for an optimal portfolio that combines the risk-free asset, Japan, and a lead country other than Japan, in normal market conditions. The figure immediately to its right shows that if the market were a bull market then the optimal portfolio in such a market would increase that CERR by 102.57% to 103.02%, the figure in the third column. However, of this additional 102.57%, 92.33% (column 4) would be lost if the portfolio were not adjusted to take account of market conditions, resulting in a final CERR of 10.69% (column 5).
The equivalent figures for the bear market are shown in row one of panel B. Here the CERR for an optimal portfolio in normal market conditions is 0.46% as before. The maximum achievable CERR in the truncated market is now zero, since with almost any degree of truncation the optimal portfolio in a bear market consists entirely of the risk-free asset. The minimum loss resulting from the market truncation is therefore 0.46%. The additional loss that would result from not re-arranging the portfolio given the market conditions is shown in column 4 as -9.86%.
Overall, the results in table 6 indicate that appropriate re-arrangement of portfolios is required to achieve the large potential gains offered by bull markets and to avoid the large losses in bear markets: holding a portfolio that is optimally diversified for normal market conditions will do neither.
V. Formal Tests
A. Correlations Table 7 presents the results of estimating models 2(a) -4(a) with λ i,j = COR i,j and models 1-4 with λ i,j = ΔCOR i,j and figure 1 illustrates some of the results graphically, using the predicted values from the estimates of models 3(a) and 3. 11 Estimates of models 2(a)-4(a) suggest that, as one might expect, DEV/DEV correlations are significantly higher (by about 0.2) than DEV/EM pairs, though this varies somewhat with the lead country. Estimates of models 1-4 suggest a marked and significant tendency for correlations to decline as the bull or bear market becomes more extreme. The base case in these columns is the most extreme bear market, which has a strongly significant negative coefficient. All other joint coefficients (that is, base case + appropriate dummy) are negative. The last two columns of coefficients suggest that this tendency is significantly more marked in DEV/DEV pairs. In fact, figure 1 emphasises that, although the reduction in correlations is greater for DEV/DEV pairs, the overall correlation for such pairs is sufficiently high to mean that DEV/DEV correlations are still higher than DEV/EM ones in truncated markets. The fall in correlations as the absolute value of the threshold increases is contrary to the findings of other studies (for example, Longin and Solnik (2001) ), most of which suggest that international correlations increase with the severity of the bear market. Our results suggest that this is not true of our data period for any of the lead countries. Table 8 and table 9 present the results of the regressions involving international diversification benefits in normal markets and in truncated 11. As explained above, from this point onwards data relating to Japan are omitted.
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B. Benefits of International Diversification
12. To check whether our results differ from other researchers' because we are using single truncation, we examined correlations in tails of doubly-truncated distributions. Our results were qualitatively unaltered. markets, both predicted and unpredicted. Table 8 shows the results of estimating models 2(a)-4(a) with λ i,j = DR NN,i,j (diversification with normal markets), and table 9 the results of estimating models 1-4 with λ i,j = DR TT,i,j or DR NT,i,j (diversification with truncated markets). Figure  2 uses the results from estimates of model 3(a) and model 3 to illustrate their overall pattern graphically. The constant in model 2(a) in table 8 confirms our earlier suggestion that the benefits of diversification in normal markets are roughly equal to a doubling of the risk-free rate of interest (for an investor with relative risk aversion of 2). But models 3(a) and 4(a) suggest that the benefits for portfolios involving DEV/DEV pairs are about half that of DEV/EM pairs, with US-led pairs suffering the most. The results in table 9, which are illustrated in the left-hand section of figure 2, suggest that in unexpectedly truncated markets DEV/DEV portfolios lose the benefits of diversification, while DEV/EM portfolios do not. For DEV/DEV portfolios the benefits fall with the degree of truncation (both in bull and bear markets); indeed they fall to such an extent that they rapidly become negative. For DEV/EM portfolios, diversification in bull markets yields much the same benefit as in normal markets, while the benefits tend to increase in bear markets. However, as noted earlier, the benefits in truncated markets are minor when compared to the other effects of truncation.
Finally, if a bull market is correctly predicted (right-hand section of of table 9), 13 benefits of diversification are higher than in normal NN,i,j ; LD i are lead country dummies distinguishing between the US (i = 1), UK (i = 2) and Australia (i = 3); THR k is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the threshold equals k, k = -1, -0.5, -0, +0, +0.5, +1, +1.5 standard deviations around the lead country's mean; DEV j is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the second country in the pair is a developed market; DEVTHR k,j equals THR k × DEV j ; and LDDEV i,j equals LD i × DEV j T-statistics are shown in parentheses and indicate statistical significance at 5% (*) and 1% (**), two-tailed tests.
13. See also footnote 5. markets, and increase with truncation. Other than at a threshold 0.5 standard deviations above the mean, which has a significant coefficient on the +0.5DEV dummy, there is no significant difference between DEV/DEV and DEV/EM pairs in this respect. Table 10 shows the results of estimating models 1-4 for λ i,j = ΔA i,j and table 11 shows the results of ΔM i,j . In the case of ΔA i,j , the 'avoidable' loss caused by holding a sub-optimal portfolio in a truncated market, we present separate estimates for the upper and lower tails because of the highly skewed nature of the distribution, as explained in the discussion of table 6. In the case of ΔM i,j we present estimates only for the upper tail, i.e., for the maximum gain achievable in a bull market (see note 5). The results for ΔA i,j in table 10 suggest first that the failure to predict where λ i,j = ΔM i,j ; LD i are lead country dummies distinguishing between the US (i = 1), UK (i = 2) and Australia (i = 3); THR k is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the threshold equals k, k = -1, -0.5, -0, +0, +0.5, +1, +1.5 standard deviations around the lead country's mean; DEV j is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the second country in the pair is a developed market; DEVTHR k,j equals THR k × DEV j ; and LDDEV i,j equals LD i × DEV j T-statistics are shown in parentheses and indicate statistical significance at 5% (*) and 1% (**), two-tailed tests.
C. Effects of Truncation on Internationally Diversified Portfolios
the nature of the market and appropriately change one's diversified portfolio imposes heavy opportunity costs on investors, costs which in terms of CERRs range from around 50 to 100 percentage points in a bull market (for example, the joint coefficient on the +0 dummy in model 1 is -103.69 + 51.37 = -52.32) and 4 to 16 percentage points in a bear market (for investors with risk aversion 2). These clearly dwarf any losses or benefits from holding a plain vanilla rather than diversified portfolio that we have discussed so far. The size of these losses appears to be largely independent of whether the portfolio involves DEV/DEV or DEV/EM pairs of assets.
The results for ΔM i,j in table 11 confirm the large potential gains from a positively truncated market and that they are negligibly affected by whether the portfolio involves DEV/DEV or DEV/EM pairs of assets.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper we have used weekly returns data from 44 countries between July 1994 and October 2003 to examine the effects of bull and bear markets on certain market variables and portfolio characteristics. In particular, we have investigated the behaviour of cross-country correlations, benefits of international diversification and the effects of truncation on the performance of diversified portfolios.
Our conclusions are as follows. Correlations between pairs of developed countries (DEV/DEV pairs) are significantly higher (by about 0.2) than correlations between pairs of developed and emerging countries (DEV/EM pairs). Contrary to other work in this field we find that for all types of portfolio correlations tend to fall in both bull and bear markets, although they fall considerably more in bull markets. The fall in correlations is greater for DEV/DEV pairs, but the overall correlation for such pairs is sufficiently high to mean that DEV/DEV correlations are still higher than DEV/EM ones in truncated markets.
Cross-country diversification is worthwhile in normal markets, increasing the certainty-equivalent rate of return by an amount roughly equal to the risk-free rate of interest (for an investor with relative risk aversion of 2). The benefits for an investor in a developed market of diversifying into an emerging market are higher than this, while the benefits of diversifying into a developed market are somewhat lower. Furthermore, in unexpectedly truncated markets DEV/DEV portfolios lose the benefits of diversification, while DEV/EM portfolios do not. For DEV/DEV portfolios the benefits fall with the degree of truncation (both in bull and bear markets); indeed they fall to such an extent that they rapidly become negative. For DEV/EM portfolios, diversification in bull markets yields much the same benefit as in normal markets, while the benefits tend to increase in bear markets. So emerging markets not only provide additional diversification benefits, but the benefits are not eroded in bull markets and are enhanced in bear markets. Nevertheless, the benefits in truncated markets are relatively small compared with the other effects of truncation.
As discussed above, our results abstract from certain practical problems, such as the unavailability of index futures, options and Exchange Traded Funds for certain emerging markets which makes the assumption of the possibility of short-selling in all stocks at all levels problematic. The thinness of markets might also put practical limits on an investor's ability to engage in DEV/EM diversification. Further useful research would consider the extent to which the potential benefits of DEV/EM diversification that we have identified are reduced by such practical difficulties.
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